WHY TRADE OPENNESS MIGHT PROMOTE MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
This article examines whether trade openness promotes multilateral environmental cooperation. The reader might wonder what one has to do with the other, but the liberal, functionalist and neo-functionalist schools of international relations (IR) have long since argued that openness to trade might foster cooperation and disperse confrontation in other policy areas. Most prominently, the suggestion that trading states might be less prone to go to war against each other dates back to at least Eméric Crucé (1623 Crucé ( [1909 ). Many of the classical liberal economists in the wake of Adam Smith (1776 Smith ( [1979 ) shared the same belief, most notably John Stuart Mill who saw 'the great extent and rapid increase of international trade' as the 'principal guarantee of the peace of the world' (Mill, 1852 (Mill, [1965 , p. 594).
The case for a "liberal peace", 2 as comprehensively put forward in Rosecrance (1986), rests on both substantive self-interest as well as more idealistic grounds.
As concerns the substantive self-interest, the major argument is that states with substantial mutual trading links have more to lose in terms of welfare if these links become interrupted by violent conflict. Also, the exploitation of trading opportunities can serve as a substitute and alternative for acquiring natural resources and markets by force. The more idealistic grounds suggest that international trade might foster a spirit of community and cooperation. Against this, proponents of the realistic school of IR have long since argued that trade is irrelevant as traditional political and military considerations dominate the decision to enter into violent conflict. The empirical evidence is somewhat indeterminate, with the majority of studies supporting the idea of a liberal peace (see, for example, Oneal et al., 1996; Hegre, 2000 ; for conflicting evidence see, for example, Barbieri, 1996; Beck, Katz and Trucker, 1998) .
A combination of self-interest and idealistic grounds could also suggest a case for trade openness promoting multilateral environmental cooperation. To start
with, countries open to trade have a reputation to defend. In a world where imports of foreign goods are still regarded as mainly benefiting the exporter, exporting countries are always at the risk of being blamed for exploiting their good economic fortunes. To participate, and possibly to lead, in multilateral cooperation, environmental or not, can provide a mechanism to disperse these concerns to some extent. This incentive will be the stronger the more a country is a net exporter of goods and services. It will also be particularly strong in the environmental field if the country is engaging in economic activity that contributes to trans-boundary and possibly global negative environmental externalities. 3 It will be strongest if these economic activities are connected to the goods and services exported by a country.
Connected to the last point, if countries more open to trade have a more substantial interest in future trade agreements in order to expand trading opportunities, then their participation in multilateral cooperation, environmental 2 Thus called in tradition of the "democratic peace", which suggests that democracies rarely fight against each other.
or not, might serve as a signalling device. The signal sent out to other countries is that the country wants to be seen as serious about multilateral cooperation in general and therefore fit for multilateral cooperation concerning trade agreements in particular (Fredriksson and Gaston, 1999, 2000) . Hoel and Schneider (1997, p. 155) go as far as arguing that a country might become excluded from a future trade agreement if it refuses to participate in multilateral environmental cooperation efforts. While there is little evidence that a country might become excluded from a trade agreement merely because of its refusal to participate in multilateral environmental cooperation, countries are in a constant process of "give" and "take" in multilateral negotiations where willingness to cooperate in the environmental arena might be necessary to achieve the country's objective in another policy field. A country that has not much to gain from multilateral environmental cooperation might still participate in order to reap the benefits of cooperation in other areas, particularly trade, where it has more to gain.
Environmental concessions might therefore be the quid pro quo necessary to strike a deal in other areas of multilateral cooperation.
As another reason grounded in self interest consider the fact that often multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) contain trade restrictive measures.
In as much as countries more open to trade are bound to be more affected by these restrictive measures than more closed countries, they have an incentive to participate in these MEAs in order to have a voice in the negotiations and influence the result according to their interest. To abstain carries the risk of being confronted with a fait accompli that might very well damage the trading interest of the abstaining country.
Self-interest can potentially deter countries open to trade from participating in
MEAs as well, however. Participation in MEAs usually implies incurring real economic costs to achieve the environmental objectives. Countries open to trade might be particularly concerned about losses to their economy's "competitiveness"
if they were to incur these costs (Stewart, 1993; Esty and Geradin, 1997) . In particular, if a MEA is likely to contain trade restrictive measures that would considerably damage the economic prospects of a country, then specific export interests might deter rather than promote multilateral environmental cooperation.
If a country perceives that in spite of participation it cannot exert enough influence to alter the trade and other restrictions contained in a MEA sufficiently towards its own interests, then this country might find it more attractive to stay outside the MEA. In particular, big and important countries might stand a chance to endanger the whole process of multilateral environmental cooperation if they perceive that the benefits are not worth the costs they incur and therefore boycott the MEA.
Witness the United States opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, which puts the treaty itself in danger.
As concerns more idealistic grounds, the major argument is that people living in countries open to trade are not only exposed to foreign goods and services, but also to new ideas and information about the environmental and other conditions outside their own countries. Trade openness might thus foster an appreciation of the problems generated by trans-boundary and global negative environmental externalities, which might put pressure on a country's policy makers to participate in multilateral efforts to solve these problems. This incentive is likely to be stronger if a country actually imports significant amounts of goods and services and not just merely exports them.
Trade liberalisation and environmental protection are often, rightly or wrongly, claimed to be conflicting objectives. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to analyse and evaluate these claims (see Neumayer, 2001 The second method is conceptually less clear. Fredriksson and Gaston (1999, 2000) argue that early ratification can function as a proxy for a country's intensity of preference for multilateral environmental cooperation. They regard ratification delay as a clear sign for lack of commitment:
Those countries that delay their ratification of treaty do so, either because they perceive the treaty provisions as too costly and severe, or lacking net benefits (or that it may be strategically worthwhile to "hold-out", in which case they risk non-implementation of the agreement). (Fredriksson and Gaston, 2000, p. 347) .
In support of their argument they refer to Sand who argues that Sand (1991, p. 250 ).
However, while early ratification might show commitment to the environmental cause of the MEA, a delay in ratification can be caused by many factors other than lack of commitment. For example, some countries might find it difficult to achieve early ratification due to the peculiarities of their political system. Also, in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, ratification by almost all countries with binding emission restrictions is delayed due to conflict about the specifics of some of the provisions contained in the Protocol.
The second method's great advantage is that it allows for greater variation among countries since the dependent variable is not simply a dichotomous one.
Connected to this point, it can examine MEAs with quasi-universal membership since countries will still differ with respect to the time of their ratification. This method's disadvantages are that the estimation technique used is far less familiar to readers. More importantly, this method cannot deal with very recent MEAs that have not been ratified by many countries yet since MEAs are usually signed at the same time by most prospective parties. For these cases only the first method is suitable. There is a disadvantage connected to analysing signature rather than ratification, however. This is because a country is not bound to a treaty unless it has ratified it. Signature is not a formal commitment. A good example for this is the de facto withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol, which is of course easily possible since the country has not yet ratified the treaty.
b. The dependent variables
In this paper we will use both methods. We use the first method for three MEAs that do not have quasi-universal membership and are too recent to having been ratified by many countries:
• the Kyoto Protocol ( to do so in the future (Neumayer, 2001 ).
• may only export one of these chemicals to another country if it has sought and received the PIC of the importing country. Furthermore, the exporting country has the duty to provide for 'labelling requirements that ensure adequate availability of information with regard to risks and/or hazards to human health or the environment, taking into account relevant international standards' (Art.
13:2). This applies to all chemicals listed in Annex III, all chemicals banned or severely restricted in the exporting country's territory (Art. 13:2) as well as to all chemicals subject to environmental or health labelling requirements (Art.
13:3). Exports of chemicals, the use of which is banned or severely restricted in the exporting country's territory, are subject to laborious information requirements for export notification as laid down in Annex V of the Convention.
• the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity Appendix I contains species (around 600 animals and 300 plant species), which are threatened with extinction and whose trade for commercial purposes is generally prohibited with few exceptions (Article III). Appendix II contains a further 4000 animals and 25,000 plants species, which might become threatened with extinction if their trade was not regulated. Their export is only allowed if the exporter has acquired an export permit from the state of export, testifying that the export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species, that the specimen were not obtained in contravention of protection laws of the exporting state and that any living specimen will be so prepared for transport that risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment is minimised (Art. IV).
• Data on the status of signature and the date of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession are from the homepages of the respective MEAs. 5 Together these six MEAs cover a broad range of environmental concern: from climate 4 We do not look at ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which has been analysed by Fredriksson and Gaston (1999, 2000) .
change, ozone layer depletion, trade in hazardous chemicals and pesticides to genetically modified organisms, biodiversity and wildlife conservation. Because ratification is open to all countries at the same time, in principle left censoring is not a problem. However, some countries gained their independence only after the MEA was opened for ratification. In these cases, ratification delay was counted from the date of their independence, which was established with the help of CIA (2000). Belarus and the Ukraine are exceptions to this rule. They had a seat in the United Nations and the right to sign and ratify international agreements before their independence from the former Soviet Union.
c. The independent variables
There is no uniformly agreed measure of trade openness, our main independent variable of interest. We will use a range of proxy variables here. The first one is a simple dichotomous variable, which is set to 1 if a country is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 0 otherwise (information taken from www.wto.org). The idea is that WTO members have revealed a commitment to trade openness in participating in a multilateral regime whose objective is the liberalisation and expansion of trade.
The next two proxies are commonly used rather simple measures: one is the natural log of the sum of exports and imports divided by gross domestic product (GDP). The other consists of the natural log of exports divided by GDP as well as, separately, the natural log of imports divided by GDP. In addition to these general trade openness variables, we also include a number of specific export interest variables for five out of the six MEAs looked at. For the Kyoto Protocol, a dummy is used for countries that export fossil fuels (data taken from World Bank, 2001 Apart from the variables for trade openness, three other general control variables are used throughout. In addition to theoretical justification they have also proven to be significant factors explaining environmental commitment in Neumayer (2002) . The first is per capita income, which is expected to have a positive effect on a country's willingness to participate in multilateral environmental cooperation efforts. In economic terms this would mean that this willingness is a luxury good with an income elasticity greater than one. Note that this need not imply that poor countries care less about trans-boundary and global environmental problems per se. Rather, because of their poverty they might prioritise issues other than these. Income per capita is measured as GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) in US$ in 1998, taken from UNDP (2000).
Second, big and "important" countries should be more environmentally committed heteroscedasticity.
than small and "unimportant" ones. As a proxy for this variable one could either take a country's total income or population since both economic power and population size should be positively correlated with "importance". The natural log of total population size is used as a proxy for a country's importance here (data taken from World Bank, 2000) . 7 Note that more important countries might show signs of stronger willingness to participate in multilateral environmental cooperation efforts not necessarily due to stronger environmental concern per se.
Rather, we hypothesise here that these countries will find it in their interest to demonstrate stronger willingness to participate in these cooperation efforts in order to demonstrate their importance in world politics, of which environment represents one part. In other words, important countries want to be seen as good citizens and leaders in world environmental affairs. Another incentive for these countries to participate in multilateral cooperation might be that it allows them to internalise part of the benefits generated by cooperation. The third and final control variable is a measure for "democracy" taken from Freedom House (2000) , based on 1998 data. Their measure is derived from expert assessments of the extent to which a country effectively provides for political rights and civil liberties, both measured on a 1 to 7 scale (Karatnycky, 1999, pp. 546-553) .
Political rights refer to, for example, the existence and fairness of elections, existence of opposition and the possibility to take over power via elections. Civil liberties refer to, for example, the freedom of assembly, the right to open and free discussion, the independence of media, protection from political terror and the prevalence of the rule of law. For the estimations used below the two indices have 7 The reader should note that total income and population cannot be used simultaneously as this been added and reversed in sign, such that 2 means lowest and 14 means highest measure of "democracy". Turning to the remaining three MEAs for which the second method was used, Table 2 For CITES, democracy and population size have a positive impact upon ratification speed, whereas income has a significantly negative impact in two estimations. WTO membership, the Fraser Institute index as well as exports per GDP exert a statistically significantly positive impact upon ratification speed.
RESULTS
Note that, again, imports per GDP are statistically significant with the opposite sign. 10 A higher ratio of threatened to all species on a country's territory speeds up ratification.
DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECT OF TRADE OPENNESS
The results reported above provide some evidence for trade openness promoting multilateral environmental cooperation. None of the proxies for trade openness consistently appears to be a statistically significant explanatory factor.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that WTO membership assumes statistical significance for four out of the six MEAs under investigation. Note that causality is not necessarily claimed here. But it suggests that being accustomed to cooperate in multilateral trade affairs goes, to some extent at least, hand in hand with countries' willingness to cooperate in multilateral environmental affairs as well.
This is a good message because a WTO dispute over some trade restrictive 10 The latter result mirrors a finding by Fredriksson and Gaston (1999) , where export openness proved to have a positive and import openness a negative effect on ratification speed for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC).
measure contained in a MEA is most likely to break out between two WTO members, where one is and the other is not a party to the MEA (Neumayer 2000) .
Hence, if WTO membership tends to promote a country's willingness to cooperate in multilateral environmental affairs, there is less danger of such a dispute.
How were also the prime candidates for producing substitutes, the major exporters had a strong incentive to bring the Montreal Protocol into force early on.
CONCLUSION
All in all, similar to Fredriksson and Gaston (1999, 2000) , but based on a much wider sample of MEAs and a broader set of proxies for trade openness, this article finds some evidence that general trade openness promotes multilateral environmental cooperation. I  II  III  IV  V  I  II  III  IV  V  I  II  III Note: Dependent variable is signature (1 = country signed; 0 = country did not sign). Reported coefficients are changes in probability for a one unit change in the variable at the mean of all variables (for a change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables). Robust standard errors. Absolute z-values in parentheses. * statistically significant at 90% level ** at 95% level *** at 99% level I  II  III  IV  V  I  II  III  IV  V  I  II  III  IV 
